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One way a multinational corporation can further satisfy its primary objective, which is
to maximize shareholder wealth, is to minimize the share of its income that is
transferred through taxation to the various sovereign nations within which it does
business. The profit maximizing firm attempts to maximize (minimize) taxable income
in those jurisdictions where income tax burdens are the least (most) in such a way as to
diminish the present value of its global total tax burden.
While the US corporate income tax rate has remained relatively stable over the
decades since most US income tax rates were last slashed as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, across the rest of the world, non-US corporate income tax rates have
continued to fall. Even though the US statutory rate was among the lowest corporate
income tax rates of any industrialized nation in 1988, by 2008, due to continuing rate
decreases around the globe the US rate had become one of the highest corporate
income tax rates amongst the G-8. In April of 2012, the US statutory rate as applied to
corporate income became the highest among all the Organization for Cooperation and
Economic Development (OECD) countries.
This study will examine the behavior of option intensive corporations during the late
1990’s. Coinciding with the longest recorded economic expansion in the history of the
United States and coupled with the so-called “internet bubble” during the second half of
i

the decade, this period of rapid stock price appreciation was also a time when many
highly profitable companies faced substantially lower current US tax liabilities due to the
large tax deductions resulting from the employee exercise of increasing quantities of
non-qualified stock options at substantial gains. Enormous tax losses reported by
employee stock option granting firms were sufficient to eliminate not only current US
corporate income tax liabilities but also several years of future tax liabilities for some
firms. Previous research has documented an increasing proportion of US multinational
corporate income recognized in foreign jurisdictions, thereby escaping the relatively
high US corporate tax rates until the foreign profits are repatriated back into the US.
Perhaps US corporate income tax rates are so high in comparison to equally
suitable substitute foreign locations that many firms have relocated their income
producing activities to lower taxed jurisdictions abroad. Or it may be that US
multinational firms engage in various cross border income shifting techniques to avoid
high US corporate income tax rates and reduce their overall global tax burden.
Profitable option intensive firms in the late 1990’s faced in effect lower US corporate
income tax rates due to their extensive employee stock option deductions and resulting
net operating loss carry-forwards. It is possible that these firms had more incentive to
recognize income domestically than their non-option intensive corporate peers.
Using a sample of the largest US firms comprising the NASDAQ-100 index on May
31, 2001, this study found evidence of higher US profitability among NASDAQ-100
multinational firms with the largest deductions resulting from the exercise of options by
their employees during the 1997 – 2000 fiscal years suggesting that these firms where
more likely to recognize or even generate income within US borders when facing
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effectively lower US corporate income tax rates. Such an observation has potential
public policy implications and contributes to the literature on tax motivated income
shifting behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Why did the corporate chicken cross the border? Because taxes were lower on
the other side.” -- Actual bad joke once told in my undergraduate tax course.

Traditionally the chief purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth
subject to ethical constraints. Whatever portion of corporate income is paid to the
government in the form of taxes would seem to defeat that wealth maximizing purpose
by transmuting corporate wealth into sovereign tax revenues. Can a corporation
maximize wealth for its shareholders by minimizing its global tax burden? Perhaps by
following that chicken across the national border? Caeteris paribus even the most
patriotic All-American chicken, would likely find its wealth maximizing purpose best
served by crossing the US border into just about any industrialized foreign country
around the globe to reduce its tax burden and thereby increase after-tax income. April
1, 2012 was the effective date of a Japanese corporate tax rate reduction, which left the
United States at the very top of developed nations in terms of the greatest tax burden
levied upon corporate income. 1
The United States not only failed to participate in the global corporate tax
competition but also came in dead last as a result. The global tax race resembled a
race to the bottom over the past 30 years as country after country has lowered its

1

Joseph Mason, "World's Highest Corporate Tax Rate Hurts U.S Economically," U.S. News &
World Report(2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/04/02/worldshighest-corporate-tax-rate-hurts-us-economically.
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corporate tax rate (Whalley, 1990; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993; Devereux,
Lockwood and Redoano, 2008), while the US has left corporate tax rates essentially
unchanged since the last corporate income tax rate cut in 1986. 2 Those cuts, part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), reduced the US corporate income tax rate by
50% and made the US corporate income tax rate the lowest rate amongst the
industrialized nations. In fact, by the time these corporate income tax rate reductions
became fully effective in 1988, the US Corporate income tax rate was 12 percent lower
than the average corporate income tax rate for the G-7 3. In the years since TRA 1986,
other developed countries have further reduced their corporate tax rates to levels even
lower than those in the US, eliminating the competitive advantage to domestically
sourced income.
Tax avoidance within the bounds of law is as ethical as it is universal. A 1934
opinion by Judge Learned Hand contained the following passage, “Anyone may arrange
his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the
pattern which best pays the treasury. There is not even a patriotic duty to increase
one’s taxes. Over and over again the Courts have said there is nothing sinister in so
arranging affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everyone does it, rich and poor
alike and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands.” 4 When it has been cost effective to do so, both corporate and individual
taxpayers have simply relocated to avoid high tax rates. In 2007 the state of Maryland

2

The only change to the US corporate tax rates since TRA1986 has been a one percentage point
increase in 1993 (Miller and Kim, 2008).
3
Liveris, A. N. (2011). Make It In America: The Case for Re-Inventing the Economy. Hoboken,
New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
4
Judge Learned Hand, Gregory v. Helvering 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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introduced a new millionaire’s tax which increased to 6 ½% the marginal income tax
rate on annual incomes exceeding $1 million. According to a CNBC article, that tax rate
increase resulted in a $1.7 billion reduction in state tax revenues as some of Maryland’s
most affluent counties experienced population declines. 5 Apparently, at least in part,
millionaires left the state for more tax friendly US locales as Maryland experienced a net
population decline of 31,000 over the remainder of the decade following this tax
increase. 6 In 2011, the State of Illinois enacted a 45% corporate tax rate increase 7
which prompted Indiana and Wisconsin to organize their own independent campaigns
intended to persuade businesses to relocate from Illinois to either Indiana or Wisconsin
and by doing so avoid higher Illinois state taxes 8. These campaigns appear to have
been effective. By the summer of 2012, at least 17 companies had plans to move out of
Illinois into Wisconsin or Indiana according to Wisconsin and Indiana Economic
Development Corporations 9. Clearly some taxpayers will act to reduce their tax
burdens as the opportunity arises when perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs.
One notable feature of the United States tax system is its imposition of tax upon
the worldwide income of domestic multinational corporations. Under such a global tax
system, however, does it make a difference in which nation the income of a US
multinational corporation is earned, particularly from the standpoint of its US tax
liability? At first glance, this global approach to US taxation might seem to make the

5

Robert Frank, "In Maryland, Higher Taxes Chase Out Rich: Study," (2012),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48120446/In_Maryland_Higher_Taxes_Chase_Out_Rich_Study.
6
ibid.
7
Douglas Belkin, Lauren Etter, and Ilan Brat, "Illinois Braces for Tax Increases," Wall Street
Journal, January 13, 2011.
8
Sean F. Driscoll, "Rockford Falls Prey to Wisconisn Luring from Across the Border," Rockford
Register Star, June 23, 2012.
9
Ibid.
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whole conversation on cross border income shifting appear moot. This is not the case.
The income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a US corporation is not subject to US tax
in most cases until repatriated back into the United States. 10 At that point a US
corporation which repatriates foreign subsidiary dividend income is liable for the full
amount of US income tax due on the repatriated foreign income less a credit for foreign
income taxes paid subject to various limits (Abrishami, 2005). Repatriation of foreign
sourced income back to the United States is not mandated by law, and some of the
foreign sourced income earned by US multinational corporations is apparently never
repatriated nor taxed at the difference between the foreign and generally higher US
income tax rates (Fritz, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007). Even if additional US
corporate income taxes are only deferred for a number of years, from a present value
standpoint the value of deferral can represent a substantial reduction in overall tax
expense compared to immediate repatriation or merely earning profits within the US
(Yang & Jeffers, 2008). When politicians and pundits refer to tax breaks which
encourage US corporations to outsource jobs or relocate manufacturing operations
overseas, I suspect it is in reality this indefinite US tax deferral on most foreign sourced
income earned by domestic multinational corporations to which they refer.
Unlike millionaires emigrating from high tax states or firms relocating across state
borders, a US multinational corporation does not necessarily have to close up shop and
fire all its employees only to begin anew within the borders of some foreign tax haven to
effect an overall minimization of their global corporate tax burden--although this is not
entirely unheard of. Companies have a large variety of alternative tools with which to

10

I.R.C. §862(a)

5
avoid paying the highest corporate tax rates and lower global tax burdens. Some of
these methods simply “shift” taxable corporate income recognized by a US multinational
corporation from higher taxed into lower taxed nations. A company may attempt to
maximize (minimize) its revenue and/or minimize (maximize) expenses such as cost of
goods sold within low (high) tax countries through strategic transfer pricing policies.
Many of these tax motivated transfer pricing strategies are considered “abusive” by the
United States Treasury. The Internal Revenue Service has considerable statutory
latitude to prevent tax evasion under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 482 and the
corresponding Treasury Regulations which govern transfer pricing between related
parties. Nevertheless, the IRS efforts under § 482 are problematic and often ineffective.
Although GlaxoSmithKline in 2006 did agree to pay a $3.4 billion IRS settlement over a
transfer pricing dispute, the largest corporate tax settlement in US history (Solomon,
2007), it was reported by the IRS that estimated tax revenue losses due to abusive
transfer pricing of $11.2 billion occurred between 1996-1998 (IRS, 1999). A subsequent
report by the US Treasury just two years later described transfer pricing abuses
resulting in estimated lost tax revenue of $53 billion for the year 2001 alone (Milbourne,
2004). Other researchers further conclude that IRS efforts to combat abusive transfer
pricing have become largely and increasingly ineffective, perhaps beginning in as early
as the 1990’s (Sullivan, 2008; Kleinbard, 2011; Grubert, 2012).
US Multinational corporations also manage the relative amounts of revenues and
expenses recognized in domestic vs. foreign jurisdictions by tactically manipulating
cross border royalty payments to, from and between foreign subsidiaries (Collins and
Shackelford, 1998), or via cost sharing agreements between affiliated multinational
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members of a controlled group (Kleinbard, 2011) or also by increasing the investment in
or utilization of assets in higher taxed countries so as to maximize the tax benefit of
depreciation or amortization deductions (Harris, 1993). Additionally, despite interest
allocation rules for multinational corporations under US tax law, tax motivated
placement of new debt instruments can still locate interest deductions wherever they
result in optimal tax benefits for the borrowing corporation (Newberry and Dhaliwal,
2001). This non-exhaustive listing of income shifting devices to avoid taxes is in
addition to the in-exhaustible variety of methods in which firms evade taxes through
ever plentiful tax shelter arrangements such as foreign LILO’s (lease in lease out
contracts) and numerous basis shifting transactions to name only two (Young, 2004) out
of the many thousands of IRS listed and reportable transactions according to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2011). Evermore creative strategies to
minimize global taxes proliferate as fast as tax practitioners can dream them up and
ostensibly even faster than they can be uncovered by the IRS (Young, 2004).
Does the current US tax system generate and collect revenues efficiently? The
efficacy of US tax law, in particular income tax law, may provide a lifetime of research
questions to study. What makes a provision of tax law effective? By one definition, a
tax law should in fact accomplish its stated objectives, yet achieve them with an
acceptable level of undesirable side effects (Feldstein, 1999).
I can no longer remember when I first heard this oft repeated truism, “When the
government imposes a tax on something, society gets less of it.” For example, if the
excise tax on alcohol and cigarettes is viewed as an attempt by government to
discourage the use of these two hazardous yet legal consumer products, it could then

7
be established that these excise taxes contribute to the decline of tobacco and alcohol
use within the US over time as the excise tax burden has increased. However, higher
cigarette taxes have also resulted in increased smuggling to avoid the tax, according to
a June 2012 CNN report 11. Other undesirable side effects include unacceptably large
amounts of excise tax paid by low income smokers whose behavior, according to
research, is largely unaffected by increased cigarette taxes and who in New York State
spent a crushing average of 23.6% of family income on cigarettes, up from 11.4% over
a period of eight years according to a 2012 New York Post article 12.
Despite the fact there are politicians who view income taxes as a method of
wealth redistribution between citizens; the primary purpose of an income tax is to
generate government revenue. Unlike an excise tax on alcohol or cigarettes, the
primary purpose of an income tax is not to discourage income production. Corporations
are taxed, but it is not in the public interest to have fewer or uniformly smaller
corporations. In addition to generating income tax revenues for the Treasury, profitable
corporations employ workers and contribute to economic growth. If a corporate income
tax rate is so high as to reduce corporate tax revenues by discouraging corporate
investment, suppressing economic growth or distorting economic incentives, or by
causing economic deadweight costs or other negative consequences which outweigh
the benefit of the tax revenues generated, then that corporate income tax rate is
inefficient (Feldstein, 1995). John Maynard Keynes noted this idea of tax efficacy with
the eloquent language typical of his day, “Nor should the argument seem strange that

11

Harriet A. Washington, "Ethicist: Health Bans and 'Sin Taxes' Can Easily Backfire," (2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/08/health/ethicist-public-health-initiatives/index.html.
12
Patrick Basham and John Luik, "The Great Cigarette-Tax Lie," New York Post, October 8 2012.
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taxation may be so high as to defeat its object, and that, given sufficient time to gather
the fruits, a reduction of taxation will run a better chance, than an increase, of balancing
the budget. For to take the opposite view today is to resemble a manufacturer who,
running at a loss, decides to raise his price, and when his declining sales increase the
loss, wrapping himself in the rectitude of plain arithmetic, decides that prudence
requires him to raise the price still more;—and who, when at last his account is
balanced with naught on both sides, is still found righteously declaring that it would have
been the act of a gambler to reduce the price when you were already making a loss.” 13
As statutory income tax rates increase, the revenues generated by the tax may actually
decline, as was a consequence of the Maryland millionaire’s tax.
US multinational corporations, subject to the highest tax rates in the developed
world domestically seem disposed to reducing their overall global tax burdens by
recognizing income in low tax countries whenever these firms are properly positioned so
as to make cross border income shifting possible as well as feasible particularly from
the cost-benefit standpoint. Is the US statutory tax rate on corporate income too high in
comparison to those statutory rates in place throughout the rest of the developed
nations, resulting in multinational corporations working to avoid or at least postpone the
payment of US taxes by transferring income abroad? Might US multinational
corporations respond to lower US corporate tax rates by refraining from shifting income
out of the US or even by shifting foreign income to the US? These are merely two
forms of the same basic research question this study will investigate.

13 John Maynard Keynes, "The Means to Prosperity," (London: Macmillan, 1933; reprint, January
14, 2008).
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It may be possible to predict the outcome of a statutory reduction in US corporate
income tax rates by investigating firms that make extensive use of non-qualified
employee stock options (ESO’s). These firms often receive large compensation
deductions against taxable income when their ESO’s are exercised to buy shares below
the current market price, which effectively reduces the rate of tax paid on its corporate
income. If these option intensive firms are found to recognize a higher proportion of
their global income in the US while non-option intensive profitable firms facing the full
statutory corporate income tax rate are recognizing an increasingly larger proportion of
their income abroad, then it may be possible to draw the conclusion that US corporate
tax rates have become so high relative to foreign OECD corporate income tax rates as
to impede US corporate tax revenue collection or even reduce domestic economic
growth.
This research fits within the stream of cross boarder income shifting literature
extending the research stream by examining conditions which might reverse the
direction of the river of income presently flowing out and away from the US. By taking a
novel approach to modeling hypothetical tax rate reductions using a proxy variable
representing reduced rates of statutory corporate income tax, it is my hope for this study
to make an incremental yet somewhat unique contribution to the existing literature on
tax motivated income shifting and to contribute to the bourgeoning public policy debate
over the direction of any future changes to US corporate tax rates.
The remainder of the dissertation is to be organized as follows: Chapter 2 will
review relevant literature, develop a research model and present testable hypotheses;
Chapter 3 will outline research methodology, define study variables and finally discuss

10
statistical methods used in hypothesis testing; Chapter 4 will discuss sample selection,
data collection and present descriptive sample statistics; Chapter 5 will present the
results of data analysis and empirical testing; then lastly, Chapter 6 will contain a
discussion of conclusions and implications from this research including areas for future
study.

11
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
“Do Taxes Matter? If Not, Why Not? If So, How Much?” 14

BOOK-TAX INCOME GAP
A simple model of rational economic behavior predicts tax avoidance behavior
when the expected benefits of avoidance exceed the expected costs (Book, 2007).
There is evidence that corporate tax avoidance was on the rise in the US during the
decade of the 1990’s (Plesko, 2004; Desai, 2003). The February 2000 Economic
Report of the President reported that annual US aggregate corporate income grew
113% between 1990 and 1999, while over the same period US corporate tax receipts
increased by only 71%. 15 Over the later part of the decade, 1996-1999 saw pre-tax
corporate profits rise over 23% while corporate tax receipts grew much more slowly,
increasing only 7.7% (McIntyre and Nguyen, 2000). US corporate tax revenues as a
share of gross domestic product (GDP) at 1.9% trailed the 2.8% proportion collected on
average by non-US members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Keightley and Sherlock, 2012). This was despite a US corporate
tax rate which was the second highest within the OECD, the weighted average
corporate tax rate for non-US OECD countries was more than 7% lower than the US

14
15

(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson and Maydew, 2005)
Economic Report of the President, Table B-26, page 337.

12
corporate tax rate of 35% in 2009 16. Each of these comparative measures suggests
mounting deterioration of the US corporate income tax base over the past two decades.
Broadly, three streams of research contribute to an explanation of corporate tax
revenues which make up a declining share of a growing base of corporate pre-tax
income. Three principal causes for the growing book-tax income difference result from
both government studies and peer-reviewed academic research include first, a growing
pervasiveness of corporate tax shelters; second, increased income shifting by
multinational corporations to reduce taxes and third, the expanding practice of granting
non-qualified stock option plans as employee compensation.
TAX SHELTERS
The U.S. Treasury issued a report in 1999 on the growth of corporate tax shelters
believed to contribute to the divergence between corporate book and tax income
(Treasury, 1999). The 1999 Treasury report is consistent with academic research
finding evidence of increasing corporate tax evasion through the use of various
reportable transactions to shield corporate income from tax (Mills, Newberry and
Tautman, 2002; Desai, 2003; Plesko, 1999). The archival stream of academic research
on abusive tax sheltering activity is somewhat thinner than other research streams
examining components of the divergence between corporate book income and tax
income in part due to the difficulty in obtaining firm level data which often includes IRS
tax-return data accessible only under special IRS agreement. In addition, the further
difficulty of even conceptualizing corporate tax avoidance makes measurement of its

16

"The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform," (The White House and Department of
the Treasury, 2012).
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magnitude imprecise and even subjective (Slemrod, 2004b). Not all corporate tax
shelters are explicitly illegal and there exists no way to distinguish with clarity between
tax avoidance which is generally legal and tax evasion which is illegal. Any line drawn
between the criminal and the aggressive must be drawn through grey area of
indeterminate width within which lawyers argue and courts ultimately decide.
As new tax shelters are created and implemented, the IRS works to discover and
identify each new abusive tax shelter to become one of the thousands of reportable
transactions listed by the IRS as belonging to the type requiring disclosure and
subjecting the corporate taxpayer to elevated scrutiny and the likely denial of any tax
benefits received. Yet in spite of reduced US corporate tax rates within TRA 1986, tax
shelters have grown more attractive to many corporations as the transaction costs
associated with tax shelters have declined along with the expected value of possible tax
penalties, the risk of facing an IRS audit having fallen precipitously (Treasury, 1999).
At first glance evidence on the growth of corporate tax shelters could lead to the
conclusion that corporate tax sheltering activity has been on the increase for many
years. The “tax gap” estimate of taxpayer non-compliance, which includes explicitly
illegal forms of tax evasion, while increasing in absolute dollars has nevertheless,
remained a constant percentage of the estimated total taxes legally due. Estimates of
the annual difference between total taxes due under applicable statutes compared to
the dollars actually paid increased between 2001 and 2006 according to Treasury
estimates from $345 billion to $450 Billion (Slemrod, 2007; Mazur and Plumley, 2007)
while the expected percentage of tax compliance had remained statistically unchanged
at about 83% in both 2001 and 2006 (Treasury, 1999). In fact, the percentage estimate
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of taxpayer compliance has remained relatively stable since 1973 when the tax gap
statistics were first published and the proportion of tax compliance also stood at about
83% (Treasury, 1988). As an aside, it is interesting to find that IRS estimates of tax
non-compliance specifically exclude the types of illegal activities which comprise a
considerable proportion of the US underground economy including for example drug
dealing, prostitution, illegal gambling.
INCOME SHIFTING
Other research has addressed cross border income shifting since the US tax rate
reductions in TRA 1986. Foreign operations as a proportion of total activity by US
multinational firms have increased since the mid 1990’s (Grubert, 2012; Sullivan, 2008;
Bauman and Schadewald, 2001). Even more striking than increased globalization on
the part of US businesses is the even greater proportion of worldwide income that is
reported to have been earned outside the US by these companies (Grubert, 2012). The
share of worldwide income earned abroad has been growing among US multinational
corporations since at least 1996 growing disproportionately larger than related
expansion of foreign business activity or increased foreign sales reported by
multinational firms since 1996 (Sullivan, 2008). Studies of income shifting using cross
sections of aggregate national level data to test for evidence of income shifting by US
multinational corporations consistently report evidence of income shifting to reduce
global tax burdens. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on cross border trade between 54
countries over the period 1997-1999 was examined to find a statistical relationship
between a countries relatively lower tax rate which was associated with less volatility in
export transfer prices; export prices which were found to be significantly lower than
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similar export price levels between unrelated parties (Clausing, 2003). An analysis of
manufacturing industry data for 1979-1997 within 22 OECD countries found significant
evidence of cross border income shifting in response to changing national average tax
rates. The authors estimated that as much as 65% of the potential increased revenue
resulting from a tax increase is subsequently lost due to income shifting (Bartelsman
and Beetsma, 2001). Another study of multinational export prices from 2006 using US
Customs data taken from documents tracking US export transactions for an eight year
period beginning in 1993 found that intrafirm export transfer prices were more than 50%
lower on average than similar prices charged by the same firm to unrelated parties
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006) consistent with the results found by Clausing
(2003). In addition, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) found a negative relationship
between the destination countries income tax rate and the reduction in price levels
between related firms. Companies were also found to reduce intrafirm prices in
response to increase import tariffs. It is estimated based on this research that transfer
price manipulation by US multinational firms in 2004 cost the US Treasury as much as
$5.5 billion in corporate income tax revenue (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006).
Taken together, these studies of national level data show consistent evidence of
international income shifting out of the US through transfer price manipulation to reduce
US tax burdens on global income.
The evidence of tax motivated income shifting resulting from the analysis of firm
level data provides less consistent evidence of the incidence of income shifting behavior
vs. the national level data among US multinational firms but does allow for certain
conclusions to be drawn concerning the specific mechanisms employed by multinational
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corporations to shift income into lower taxed foreign countries and minimize their US tax
liabilities.
Using actual corporate tax return data, it is estimated that in 1988 US
manufacturing firms shifted $7.7 in income before taxes to their foreign subsidiaries
using a model that assumes equal rates of after-tax return amongst affiliated members
of a US consolidated group (Rousslang, 1997). Two research papers in 1993 found
evidence of tax induced income shifting in the years immediately following TRA 1986
(Harris, 1993; and Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993). Harris (1993) made comparisons
of international firms to purely domestic firms in terms of tax expense and pretax
income. Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993) examined changes in foreign and domestic
income subject to tax to conclude that multinational firms participated in tax motivated
income shifting. In the years immediately following the US corporate rate reductions of
TRA 1986, as the US was the low tax jurisdiction among developed nations, it is not
surprising to find much of the income shifting evidence for the remainder of the decade
of the 1980’s pointing to US multinational corporations shifting income into the US to
take advantage of relatively low corporate income tax rates among developed nations
subsequent to TRA 1986. Due in part to a 2 year phase in of the new lower tax rates
beginning in 1987 combined with the creation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)
regime within TRA 1986, alternative explanations for the results presented in 1993 by
these two post TRA 1986 studies cause their evidence of income shifting to seem
inconclusive (Shackelford, 1993). In 1996, however by examining worldwide tax
burdens and difference in reported profitability between domestic and foreign
corporations more reliable evidence of post TRA 1986 income shifting is found among
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firms exhibiting higher volumes of intrafirm cross border transfers in two samples of firm
data covering two years each beginning in 1982 and 1988. The author chooses these
two periods around but not including the passage and implementation of the tax law
changes in TRA 1986 (Jacob, 1996), improving upon the quality of conclusions made
about post TRA 1986 income shifting evidence drawn from the earlier inconclusive 1993
research. Taken together, the results of these studies of both national level and firm
level data present relatively strong evidence from which to conclude that US
multinational firms shift income across national borders motivated by the desire to
reduce overall global tax burdens. The remainder of the income shifting literature
reviewed herein attempt primarily to descriptively analyze common attributes of income
shifting firms while presenting evidence of other income shifting methods in addition to
tax motivated transfer price management which may also enable US multinational firms
to avoid recognizing income in those nations with relatively high corporate tax burdens.
By replicating the Jacob (1996) study after hand collecting much of the missing
information within the sample of firm year observations drawn from Compustat data,
researchers were able narrow the prevalence of post TRA 1986 tax motivated income
shifting to the top eight sample deciles determined by firm size (Conover and Nicoles,
2000). This firm size effect has been documented in other income shifting research
(Rego, 2003; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993) along with a transactional volume
effect (Grubert, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2001) which suggest
economies of scale which make possible increased tax motivated income shifting.
Other research that examines income shifting using methods other than cross
border income shifting has found evidence of income shifting increasing along with
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measures of “firm flexibility” according to Harris (1999). So called highly flexible firms
must have sufficient expenses such as advertising or interest which can be relocated to
alternate tax jurisdictions without prohibitive transaction costs. Research in 2001 found
that tax incentives influenced the location of interest deductions as a mechanism of
income shifting to lower global tax burdens (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001). Evidence
has been found pointing to income shifting through the manipulation of interest
payments as well as dividend and royalty payments between members of an affiliated
group for the use of intangibles (Collins and Shackelford, 1998). In related research
involving intangibles, Grubert (2003) found that corporate tax rates at the high and low
extremes of the global distribution had a tendency to attract manufacturing firms with
large research and development expenditures. His results suggest that either very high
or very low tax jurisdictions are attractive to these firms because a large volume of
transactions involving research and development allows firms to mitigate high tax rates
or increase the benefits of low tax rates through income shifting (Grubert, 2003).
Multinational firms with deferred tax assets in the form of net operating losses carry
forwards are also demonstrate greater flexibility with a propensity to shift income and
recognize within the US a larger share of worldwide earnings (Newberry and Dhaliwal,
2001). Finally, it is possible to recognize more income within a lower taxed country by
what is termed “real” income shifting (Clausing, 2009). In this study, Clausing (2009)
attempts to separate “financial” income shifting which involves primarily the pricing of
certain transactions between affiliated group members from “real” income shifting.
Both tax motivated transfer pricing and tax motivated manipulation of the location
of and rents charged for the use of intangible assets or on interest payments on loans

19
made to affiliate members within a multinational consolidated group are examples of
financial income shifting while for this study, so called “real” income shifting involves
relocating the actual productive activity of a US multinational corporation to a lower
taxed international jurisdiction (Clausing, 2009). To operationalize “real” income
shifting, changes in the scale of employment within national borders serves as a proxy
for the differences in overall scale of “real” operations within national borders. Since
“real” operations are not as flexible in terms of the ease to which they can be relocated
with low transactional costs between countries to facilitate cross border income shifting,
it is not at all unexpected that measures of “real” income shifting were related far less
significantly to cross sectional variances in national tax rates than were measures of
“financial” income shifting measures which exhibited a much higher sensitivity to
multinational tax rates. The income shifting literature points to the existence of
widespread cross border income shifting motivated by opportunities to reap substantial
financial benefits which accrue to income recognized outside the US. These benefits
have grown larger as function of corporate tax rate differentials between the US and the
other OECD nations, tax rates which have incrementally and increasingly diverged over
the past two decades. At the same time, a variety of factors have resulted in declining
transactional costs and reduced risks of penalties associated with income shifting
intended to reduce corporate tax payments. Once again the empirical evidence for
income shifting is consistent with a simple model of rational economic behavior on the
part of multinational corporations that are wealth maximizing tax minimizers to the
degree that opportunities exist to engage in tax motivated income shifting where the
expected savings from both a reduction in global tax liability and lower present value
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cost of taxes deferred over an essentially unlimited period of time proceeding
repatriation back to the US which continue to exceed the expected value of all costs
both explicit and implicit attributable to income shifting across national borders.
The tax cost to repatriate foreign income back to the US has steadily increased
as foreign corporate income tax rates have declined relative to US rates over the
preceding two decades, ignoring any temporary reduction in the cost foreign income
repatriation resulting from the limited availability of any tax holidays. Therefore the tax
competition which continues to occur between developed countries, coupled with the
growing levels of income shifting by US multinational firms seeking to benefit from lower
foreign tax rates is the likely cause of evidence that firms to avoid the high tax cost of
earnings repatriation by maintaining large overseas accumulations of cash on their
corporate balance sheets (Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007). This conclusion is
based on their investigation of cash holdings within a sample of nearly 35,000
observations on firms with $100 million in total assets over the years 1982-2004 which
limited to US corporations outside of the regulated utilities and financial services
industries. The extent of foreign cash holdings representative of US multinational
income that has not been repatriated and thus not subject to US tax on worldwide
corporate income further contributing to the eroding US corporate tax base and
contributing to the evidence supporting a theory that US corporate tax rates are so high
in comparison to non-US OECD nations that the corporate income tax at current rates is
inefficient both in terms of distorted economic incentives as evidenced by the
disproportionately large foreign cash holdings by US multinational firms and in terms of
the ability of the US corporate income to generate income evidenced by falling
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corporate tax receipts during a period of growth in corporate pretax income at a time the
US has among the highest tax rates on corporate income relative to other developed
nations.
NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS
The final research stream which contributes to the understanding of aggregate
growth rates for corporate pre-tax income far in excess of the rate of growth in
aggregate corporate taxable income since at least the mid-1990s relates to the tax
treatment of nonqualified employee stock options, the use of which began to explode in
the mid-90s, concurrent with the beginning of these dramatic increases observed in the
gap between corporate book income and reported corporate taxable income.
Researching these nonqualified options provided evidence documenting the extent to
which many firms have reduced, or even eliminated their entire tax liabilities as a result
of deductions relating to the exercise of nonqualified stock options by their corporate
employees (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2002; Graham, Lang and Shackelford, 2004). The
estimated tax benefit of tax deductions resulting from the recognized gains by employee
option holders upon exercise grew over 100% from $27.6 billion to $56.4 billion annually
over the years 1998 to 2000 (Sullivan, 2002) representing not only the growth of stock
option compensation which saw a rise in the number of employees receiving
compensation partially in the form of stock options beginning early in the decade of the
1990’s with approximately one million employee stock options recipients while
approximately 7-10 million corporate employees were granted these non-qualified
options by early in the first decade of the 21st century. These millions of additional
employee stock options recipients, by the early 2000’s were growing to encompass a
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more diverse collection of employees beyond just the members of upper management
(Sullivan, 2000). Subsequent research in this area found evidence that the tax benefits
of options exercise were of sufficient magnitude to influence the optimal capital
structure 17 among firms which exhibited the most extensive use of employee stock
options during the latter part of the decade of the 1990’s.

17

The theory of optimal capital structure has a long history beginning with seminal research in
1958 and 1961by Modigliani and Miller. The theory posits the existence of an optimal capital structure
which includes debt at levels sufficient to result in equilibrium between the tax benefits of deductible
interest payments upon corporate debt and the costs associated with the risks of increased leverage.
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CHAPTER 3
MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

It is likely that companies substitute between debt and other tax shields such as
amortization and depreciation or investment tax credits as the firm seeks its optimal
capital structure (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Graham, Lang and Schackelford
(2004) find evidence that non-qualified stock options do act as a substitute tax shield in
place of debt, which may offers an explanation for the perplexing case of very large
profitable US firms which contain little or no debt within their capital structures. While
there may be substitution between available corporate tax shields for a firm seeking its
optimal capital structure according to the current literature, it seems evident that all tax
shields are not created equal. As a substitute form of corporate tax shield and at least
from the corporate point of view, the favorable tax treatment afforded nonqualified
corporate stock options comes as near to statutory perfection as has ever been
achieved. In addition to realizing compensation deductions for compensation that was
neither paid nor charged against corporate income upon option exercise, the
corporation receives in cash the option strike price from the employee upon option
exercise.
Other corporate tax shields have a cost to the corporate recipient of the tax
benefit, a cost that in absolute terms generally outweighs the tax benefit received 18. For
example, the tax benefit of deductible interest at current US statutory corporate income
tax rates results in tax benefits of only $.35 for each $1.00 paid in tax-deductible

18

This is ignoring explicit or implicit non-tax benefits accruing from the use of tax shields, such as
increased return on equity resulting from leverage as a tax shield.
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interest. To receive the tax benefits of depreciation or amortization as a tax shield the
corporation must to incur the acquisition cost of a depreciable or amortizable asset.
Conversely the favorable tax treatment afforded to non-qualified stock options results in
a corporate tax deduction upon exercise for compensation at no real cost to the
corporate employer. The amount of gain recognized both as income to the exercising
employee and compensation expense to the corporation is calculated as the amount by
which the market share price exceeds the option strike price at exercise.
Under Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25 the financial accounting
treatment afforded nonqualified stock options granted at or below the money results in
no income recognition by the recipient employee and no compensation expense to the
option granting corporation. The subsequent exercise of the option results in a credit to
additional paid in capital for the current tax benefit realized from deductions from
corporate taxable income resulting from stock option exercise. It must be stated that
while in theory, each employee stock option exercised is dilutive upon the ownership
interests of pre-existing shareholders; as a practical matter, these effects are probably
immaterial. The number of additional shares issued in satisfaction of options exercised
are very likely insufficient in magnitude to cause a measurable decline in market share
price.
While in form employee stock options may be an alternate tax shield substituting
for leverage in firms with so little debt on their balance sheets. In substance employee
stock options have a rather one sided cost-benefit relationship. Their usage results in
the benefit of additional cash along with the potential for corporate tax deductions from
option exercise without cost. Therefore I propose that in substance employee stock
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options result in reduced tax liabilities indistinguishable from the reduction that would
result from a statutory reduction in corporate income tax rates. Let Tr be the reduced
tax rate that ignoring the tax benefit of stock options equates tax liability to the statutory
corporate tax liability after stock option compensation deduction. Let Pi represent
pretax income before option deductions, Od represent the deduction for stock option
compensation, and Ts represent the statutory tax rate on corporate income respectively,
then:
for Pi > Od
TrPi = Ts(Pi - Od)

(a); and

TrPi = TsPi - TsOd

(b); and

Tr = Ts(1- Od / Pi)

(c)

For every non-zero amount of tax benefit triggered by the recognition of income
on the part of employees exercising non-qualified stock options, in amounts insufficient
to completely offset all income subject to tax at the statutory corporate rate: there also
exists a hypothetically reduced tax rate which would result in an identically reduced
corporate tax liability in the absence of any deduction resulting from the exercise of
employee stock options.
It might be counter argued that such a reduced tax rate might be computed for
any corporate deduction which partially offsets income subject to the statutory corporate
income tax rate. However, the case of non-qualified employee stock options is unique
in two ways. First, as previously discussed these particular compensation deductions
become available to the corporation at no real cost to the corporation. Second, the
amount of tax benefit that ultimately results from the exercise of employee options is
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exogenous to the corporation. Corporate tax deductions resulting from the exercise of
previously granted stock options are triggered by the external actions of current or
former corporate employees who are individually attempting to maximize their own
personal wealth, rather than by any endogenous corporate desire to maximize
shareholder wealth or minimize tax liabilities. Also exogenous is the amount of the
resulting deduction for compensation expense that becomes available to the corporation
upon the exercise of non-qualified employee stock options. While the strike price is
chosen by the options granting corporation endogenously, it is most likely set at the
market share price on the grant date. The amount of compensation expense deduction
available to the corporation is an exogenous function of the market price per share upon
option exercise occurring on a day chosen externally by the option holding employee.
While the corporation has control over the terms and timing of its initial grant of stock
options to its employees, any potential future reduction in corporate income tax liabilities
resulting from an option grant to employees is of uncertain likelihood as well as
unknown magnitude. Non-qualified stock options granted to corporate employees
under the financial accounting rules that existed before 2004 in their substance result in
exogenous tax effects similar to a statutory reduction in corporate rates, more similar
than the costly alternative tax shields options resemble in form.
As the result of this substance over form argument, this study will treat stock
option deductions occurring within the sample population of corporate firm years as a
proxy variable for a hypothetical reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate applicable
to corporate taxable income to individual firm year observations as if the applicable
statutory rate for each firm year was both stochastic and continuous, in stark contrast to
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the actual statutory corporate income tax rate which is constant over the entire sample
period.
The general research questions proposed in the introductory chapter can now be
viewed in the light of the findings reported within this review of the existing literature
above. Those questions were as follows. First, is the US statutory tax rate on
corporate income so high compared to statutory rates over the rest of the developed
world as to induce multinational corporations to avoid or at least postpone the payment
of US taxes by transferring income to relatively low taxed nations? Alternatively, might
US multinational corporations respond to lower US corporate tax rates by not income
shifting or even by shifting foreign income back into the US?
First, based on the simple model of rational economic behavior which takes into
consideration the relationship between expected costs and benefits to predict corporate
behavior, I would expect to find evidence suggesting that high corporate tax rates would
be associated with a greater degree of tax avoidance through the use of corporate tax
shelters. While the literature documented declining expected costs to engage in a tax
shelter, the expected benefits of sheltering income from US taxes remain relatively
unchanged since the mid 1980’s as US taxes are not intrinsically high at current levels.
Due to US corporate income tax rates which remain largely unchanged since TRA
1986, the expected benefits of participation in a corporate tax shelter remained
unchanged which might provide some explanation for the stability of the approximate
83% expected rate of tax compliance over the past two decades. However, stable tax
rates are insufficient to explain the continued 83% estimated compliance rate as this
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rate is also relatively unchanged since the first 83% estimate was published in 1973, a
time when corporate tax rates were two times the rates passed in 1986.
Income shifting researchers found evidence of income shifting into the US by
multinational corporations to take advantage of relatively low US tax rates in the late
1980’s as compared with relatively higher tax rates in other developed nations. The
literature exploring multinational income shifting presents evidence, however of tax
motivated income shifting out of the US over the past two decades subsequent to the
1980’s. This research culminates in a study which documents the disproportionate
amount of cash accumulations within the foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms due
to the high tax costs of repatriation of the increasing share of income shifted and
reported as earned in foreign jurisdictions. Looking at national level data for the
aggregate of US multinational corporations there seems to be strong evidence
consistent with income shifting and for ruling out the alternate suggestion that higher
overall levels of profitability are experienced outside of the US. In addition the
increasing share of foreign income as a share of global US multinational corporate
income was in excess of amounts that might be explained by increased global
profitability rather than income shifting into lower taxed jurisdictions abroad. If the
relatively high rates of tax on US corporate income drive the recognition of income
abroad that follows that the relatively high US corporate rates provide one explanation
for US corporate tax system that has become increasingly inefficient in terms of its
ability to generate corporate tax revenue even marginally proportionate to the growth of
US corporate income. Therefore one might conclude based on current literature that
while in an absolute sense, US corporate income tax rates have remained essentially
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unchanged over the past 25 years, the efficiency of existing statutory corporate income
tax rates has declined based on the reduction of corporate tax revenues collected as a
share of a growing base of corporate pretax income, and that this decline in US
corporate tax efficiency might be the result of tax rate changes in the rest of the
developed world, which have made US rates relatively high in comparison.
This relative rate differential increases the expected benefit of shifting income out
of the United States and deferring indefinitely the tax cost of repatriating foreign income.
Repatriating foreign profits to the US causes a “second level” of corporate income tax
above foreign taxes paid in most cases, in the form of US corporate tax applied to
repatriated income at a rate approximately equal to the excess of US income tax rates
over foreign rates paid upon the foreign income, foreign rates that are in all likelihood,
lower than US rates. Although the two general research questions mirror each other, it
is the second question which asks how companies might react if US statutory tax rates
on corporate income were lowered in terms of a reversal in the overall direction of
income shifting or perhaps decreased incentives to shift income outside the US at all.
Both possible scenarios would result in an increased amount of taxable income reported
as earned within the US. This discussion of the current literature viewed under the light
of the simple model of rational economic behavior leads to the following testable
hypotheses:
H1: Firms experiencing greater tax benefits from the exercise of employee stock
options, will exhibit greater domestic taxable return on assets and/or sales inconsistent
with typical income shifting away from the US and into lower taxed developed countries.
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H2: Firms without foreign operations which experience greater tax benefits from
the exercise of employee stock options, will exhibit less domestic taxable return on
sales and/or assets than their multinational counterpart sample firms which would be
consistent with the multinational firms shifting additional foreign income into the US.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
It is problematic to make direct observations of income shifting within firm level
data (Harris, Morck and Slemrod, 1991). Instead researchers have looked at the likely
influence income shifting would have on other easily observable variable thought to be
correlated with shifted income so that this alternative correlated variable can serve as a
proxy measurement of the unobservable level of shifted income (Gruber and Mutti,
1991; Hines and Rice, 1990). One such model to indirectly measure shifted income
begins with a linear function of US tax liability developed within in a study of
international income shifting by Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1993) and published as a
chapter in a 1993 book entitled “Studies in International Taxation” published by the
University of Chicago Press. This linear model of current tax liability is given as follows:
Tu = rU (Yu – Yso + Ysi)
Tu is the total current US tax liability. ru is the US statutory rate on corporate income.
The expression within the brackets represents current reported taxable income and is
the combination of actual current US taxable income (Yu) less the amount of current
taxable income shifted out of the US to lower tax countries (Yso) plus the amount of
current taxable income shifted into the US from higher taxed countries (Ysi). Only Tu,
the total current US tax liability is commonly reported by the majority firms according to
Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1999). As the US statutory corporate tax rate is also
known, reported taxable income which is the sum of the three unobservable
components within the brackets, could be easily calculated. Therefore, only the
individual values of these three variable components which together make up reported
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taxable income would still remain unknown. Individually, these values for multinational
corporations are generally unobservable. Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1999) then note
the following, “A firm’s U.S. income is likely to be roughly proportional to the size of its
U.S. operations. . . We want to explain income shifting, Ysi - Yso, using total US federal
taxes, Tu = rU (Yu – Yso + Ysi). Dividing the latter variable by the size of US operations
allows us to interpret variations in the resulting ratio (after controlling for other obvious
predictors of US taxable income), as due to income shifting.” The researchers then use
this model to find evidence of US multinational corporations engaging in tax motivated
cross border income shifting to minimize taxes during the mid-1980’s.
My dependent variable in this study of income shifting among option intensive
firms is adapting directly from the income shifting variable developed by Harris, Morck
and Slemrod (1999) and discussed above. Within a more recent sample of firms from
the latter half of the 1990’s, relatively high US corporate income tax rates on a global
basis led to my expectation that US multinational corporations would be more likely to
shift taxable income away from the US so that lower (higher) US taxable return on US
assets or lower US taxable return to sales would be consistent (inconsistent) with
income shifting behavior during a later portion of the 1990’s subsequent to aggressive
tax competition engaged in by non-US OECD nations which further reduced their
corporate tax rates to levels below the US corporate tax rates set by TRA 1986.
My independent variable of interest thought to predict income shifting behavior is
a metric representing the extent of available tax benefits resulting from the employee
exercise of stock options. It is expected that stock option deductions which serve to
proxy for hypothetical statutory corporate income tax rate reductions faced by the
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individual firms over each annual set of observations will prove to be a significant
predictor of the dependent variable which is a proxy measure of income shifting.
Alternative specifications of the option tax benefit variable could have included the
amount of reduction in effective tax rates (EFT) due to the option deduction. This
method was rejected for this study due to the low number of firms that would remain in
the sample with positive effective tax rates subsequent to the adjustment for the tax
benefit due to stock option exercise. Desai (2003) reported that firms make use of the
entire amount of option deductions even when an NOL is generated in the current year.
Therefore the total tax benefit of stock options exercised during an annual period has
spillover affects into future periods which could predict the magnitude of firm cross
border income shifting activities. While tax benefits of options upon current tax expense
are potentially limited by pre-option current tax expense. Marginal tax rates have also
been simulated to make predictions about firm behavior, however for a study of income
shifting behavior this method is problematic as its prediction sets up a tautology in that
the marginal tax rate, the rate of tax upon the next dollar of income earned by a
corporation is dependent upon the locations in which it recognizes global income. These
are thought to be predicted by the global rates it faces on its next dollar of income which
is also a function of the locations it chooses to recognize its global income, and so on.
So in light of the findings by (Desia, 2003) the natural log of the tax deduction available
from the employee exercise of stock options will retain the maximum number of firm
observations and capture all the information contained in the level of stock option
deductions both currently and upon future fiscal periods.
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Other variables control for non-tax factors which have been shown to affect
observed profitability levels in previous income shifting research and contribute to the
following panel regression equations to be estimated:
USTUSAtj = ά + LNDCTESOtj + SIZEtj + FGNRATIOtj + SICtj + YRtj + έtj

(1)

USTUSStj = ά + LNDCTESOtj + SIZEtj + FGNRATIOtj + SICtj + YRtj + έtj

(2)

Where for firm j in year t = [1997 – 2000]:
USTUSAtj

=

current US tax expense scaled by US long-term assets

USTUSStj

=

current US tax expense scaled by non-export US sales

LNDCTESOtj =

natural log of the absolute dollars of stock option tax deduction

SIZEtj

the natural log of global assets

=

FGNRATIOtj =

the ratio of foreign to global sales, measuring the extent of
foreign operations

SICtj

=

a vector of effects coded industry dummy variables taking
values 0 or -1

YRij

=

a vector of dummy variables indicating fixed effects for 1997,
1998 or 1999

έtj

=

residual

A significant positive coefficient for LNDCTESOtj, the independent variable believed to
proxy for hypothetical statutory tax rate reductions, would indicate reduced income
shifting away from the US and the possibility of income shifting back into the US by
these firms facing effectively lower tax rates due to their deductions from option
exercise in support of H1. Bifurcating the sample into two groups of firms, those with
and those without foreign operations and then comparing the results of regression
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estimated separately for each group may then give additional information with which to
reject or accept H2 which suggests greater increases in US taxable income associated
with larger stock option deductions among multinational firms which could shift foreign
income back into the US vs. their purely domestic counterparts.
The testing of hypotheses as applied to this cross section of 97 NASDAQ-100; j =
97 firms over a series of 1997-2000; t = 4 annual observations is a matter of discovering
the degree to which increases in tax benefits resulting from stock option exercise are
associated with increases in taxable return on assets and or taxable return on sales
within the US and among US multinational corporations vs. their domestic counterparts.
Using a method of panel regression which takes into account the annually repeated
observations for each firm within the cross section will be likely to increase the likelihood
of finding significant results. Containing only four years of annual data but nearly 25
times as many firms within the cross section, a panel method is more appropriate for
this data than a time series analysis as the latter typically relies on larger values of t in
terms of repeated measures over time (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 714-718). Since the values
observed in the raw data clearly increase over time, a fixed effects model which
accommodates differences in the linear intercept term over time is my specific choice in
panel method, which is said to give consistent parameter estimates and is generally
preferred to a random effects model (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).
Serial correlation is a frequent occurrence in financial statement data over
consecutive reporting periods. Financial statement observations have strong built in
relationships to the previous year(s) observation(s) especially when companies
experience growth over the sample time period (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 400-403). Although
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first estimation of this fixed effects model of panel regression will employ the ordinary
least squares (OLS) model with three (t-1) dummy variables to indicate fixed effects for
sample firm years (Park, 2009), if Durbin-Watson statistics based on the estimated
regression residual values lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no first order
serial correlation (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, pp. 179-182), a first order
autoregressive (OLS) model will next be estimated in an attempt to reduce the effects of
serial correlation. Further tests will determine the extent of additional violations of the
OLS assumptions to be addressed.
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CHAPTER 5
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

Sample firms are drawn from corporations which comprise the NASDAQ-100
index of the largest nonfinancial services industry firms trading on the NASDAQ stock
exchange. The starting point for sample selection is the list of firms which comprise the
NASDAQ-100 index as of May 30, 2001. Compustat defines a fiscal year as having an
annual financial statement reporting period ending any time within June 1 of the current
year through May 31 of the subsequent year. This means that within Compustat data,
fiscal year 2000 is assigned to data taken from financial statements with any year-end
date occurring between the period which begins June 1, 2000 and ends May 31, 2001.
The firms which comprise the NASDAQ-100 index on May 30, 2001, the end of FY
2000, along with their ticker symbols are listed in Appendix A.
NASDAQ firms are chosen for the research sample due to the magnitude of
stock option tax deductions generated by the employee exercise of nonqualified stock
options over the last half of the decade of the 1990’s which are the annual periods
represented within my cross section of firms, 1996-1997. Prior research involving stock
option compensation has documented the highest level of stock option intensity within
the NASDAQ-100 as compared to other stock indices such as the S&P 100 during this
time period (Hanlon and Shelvin, 2002; Graham, Lang and Shackelford, 2004).
Graham, Lang and Shackelford (2004) document the degree of stock option intensity
found within the NASDAQ-100 index of firms, finding evidence for fiscal year 2000 of
reduced marginal tax rates for nearly all NASDAQ-100 firms compared to their findings
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of reduced marginal rates occurring for about 25% of S&P 100 firms as the result of
stock option exercise.
2-digit SIC industry codes were retrieved for 99 of the 100 index firms for which
information was available. NASDAQ-100 companies are distributed among 5 of the 10
defined SIC industry groups and 15 separate industries within these groups as shown in
Figure 1. The largest sample concentration of 49 firms is found within just 1 industry
group, while 82 of the 99 sample firms make up the total number of firms within the 2
largest industry groups which occur within the sample data.
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Table 1
Distribution of Sic Codes Among NASDAQ Firms FY 2000

Manufacturing Industry Group
Apparel and Other Textile Products
Paper and Allied Products
Chemicals and Allied Products
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
Electrical and Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and Related Products
Group Total
Transportation, Communication and Utilities
Group
Communications
Retail Trade Group
General Merchandise Stores
Furniture, Home Furnishings and Equipment
Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Miscellaneous Retail
Group Total
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
Depository Institutions
Service Industries
Business Services
Engineering and Management Services
Group Total

2-digit
SIC
CODE
23
26
28
35
36
37
38

# of
Firms
1
1
10
11
23
1
2
49

48

11

53

1

57
58
59

1
1
2
5

60

1

73
87

32
1
33
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Data on stock options exercised for sample firms was hand collected from
individual financial statement footnotes within the annual reports submitted to the
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) on form 10-K. Previous researchers have made
the recommendation that stock option data, in order to achieve an adequate level of
accuracy, be hand collected from financial statement footnotes rather than estimated
from cash flow statement entries, when investigating tax benefits from stock option
exercise (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2002). Compustat data is not adjusted for any reduction
in current tax expense nor for reported effective tax rates (Mills, Newberry and
Trautman, 2002). Neither are the balance sheet accounts for deferred taxes affected by
the current tax benefit resulting from option exercise since this particular book-tax
difference is permanent and never reverses. Only infrequently to annual reports contain
sufficient information within the statement of cash flows or statement of changes in
equity to ascertain the current tax benefit that results from stock option exercise (Hanlon
and Shevlin, 2002). Annual reports before 2004 almost universally disclosed the
granting and exercise of employee stock options only by footnote disclosure under
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123 and Accounting Principles
Board (ABP) Opinion No. 25 which allowed for the recording of compensation expense
equal to the intrinsic value of options granted to employees (Graham, Lang and
Shackelford, 2004). Since the typical practice was for the strike price to be set at or
below the market price on the date granted, non-qualified options granted under the
pre-2004 rules ordinarily had no intrinsic value which resulted in no compensation
expense that could be reported on the income statement.
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SFAS 131 required financial statement footnote disclosure of segment reporting
information beginning in 1997, which for most firms resulted in disclosure of geographic
segment data. Data was hand collected from disclosures of sales and long-lived assets
attributed to the United States for each firm over the years 1997-2000, one less year
than of data than for stock option exercise data however the additional year of stock
option sample data from the year 1996 allows for the creation of lagged tax variables
related to option exercise. The overwhelming majority of firms categorized as foreign
total US export sales including sales attributed to US Foreign Sales Corporations
(FSC’s). A small number of firm year observations did not categorize as foreign sales
their US export sales and comprised less than 5% of firm year observations. These
observations were transformed to exclude US export sales from reported US sales to
maintain consistency across the entire sample for reported amounts of US Sales.
Remaining data for the sample of NASDAQ-100 firms was collected using
Research Insight from Compustat. Missing observations for current tax expense within
the data retrieved from the Compustat database was supplemented by hand collection
when possible from the tax footnote disclosures within the annual statements. Table 2
contains descriptive statistics for data collected for the cross section of firms within the
annual periods 1997-2000. The data takes the form of unbalanced panel data as not
every firm was in existence for the entire time series 1997-2000, which combined with
scattered missing values, results in 326 firm year observations with complete data on all
variables. Jarque-Bera tests of normality result in extremely high test statistics for all
raw variables listed resulting in rejection of the null hypotheses of normally distributed
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values. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the regression variables for equations
(1) and (2).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Data Points over Entire Sample
(000,000)'s except for Observations
ASSETS

GBLNIBT

FSALES

ISOCASH

ISOTAX

Mean

4,351.26

519.67

1,015.28

71.07

369.59

Median

1,435.73

116.41

222.28

20.24

51.47

Maximum

98,903.00

15,141.00

19,814.00

1,888.92

13,925.34

Minimum

19.24

(7,439.80)

-

-

-

Std. Dev.

10,730.97

2,014.78

2,378.87

171.77

1,189.62

6.04

4.36

4.30

5.95

7.11

45.71

27.63

26.15

49.89

66.64

Jarque-Bera

26,763.89

9,274.04

8,283.75

31,791.28

57,751.35

Probability

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

1,418,511.91

169,412.83

330,980.38

23,168.24

120,486.08

37,424,933,415.83

1,319,281,837.31

1,839,176,986.52

9,588,550.37

459,940,592.84

326.00

326.00

326.00

326.00

326.00

SALES

US LTA

US SALES

US TAX

3,074.37

1,093.98

2,059.09

171.25

867.39

237.20

516.24

26.33

Maximum

39,090.00

29,816.00

32,177.00

4,744.00

Minimum

2.52

2.46

2.52

(161.00)

Std. Dev.

6,282.98

3,145.68

4,357.84

562.29

3.43

6.10

3.99

5.42

15.32

45.76

21.51

34.85

Jarque-Bera

2,700.46

26,859.59

5,517.12

15,381.33

Probability

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

1,002,243.62

356,638.91

671,263.24

55,826.22

12,829,633,711.81

3,215,964,204.97

6,172,009,337.54

102,754,101.40

326.00

326.00

326.00

326.00

Skewness
Kurtosis

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations

Mean
Median

Skewness
Kurtosis

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics on Regression Variables Equations (1) and (2)
(000,000)'s except for observations
USTUSLT
0.311001
0.077463
4.123347
-0.167047
0.545487
3.090278
15.13658

USTUSSALE
0.073906
0.042763
0.590904
-0.326572
0.100902
1.633767
8.013420

LNDCTESO
3.934352
3.963342
9.541465
-4.674413
2.226712
-0.54437
4.206421

FGNRATIO
0.280378
0.275153
0.894175
0.000000
0.218352
0.299194
2.133147

SIZE
7.238321
7.272120
11.50189
2.957095
1.531769
-0.176154
3.494836

Jarque-Bera

2465.549

475.9900

35.10072

14.74714

4.904411

Probability

0.000000

0.000000

0.000000

0.000628

0.086103

Sum

99.20925

23.57592

1255.058

89.44057

2309.024

Sum Sq. Dev.

94.62293

3.237649

1576.723

15.16151

746.1283

Observations

319

319

319

319

319

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Well over half of the NASDAQ-100 component firms on May 31, 2000 were
added to the index over the course of the periods 1996-2000. As the index is
comprised of the 100 largest NASDAQ traded firms in terms of annual market
capitalization levels, the fact that 59 firms were recent additions to the index over the
previous five years might be indicative of high rates of growth with the firms that make
up the research sample. Figure 1 contains graphs depicting annual median levels of
asset, sales and pretax income levels which have grown consistently over the period
1997-2000.
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Figure 1. Annual Median Sales, Asset, Pretax Income and Us Tax Levels 1997-2000
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The effects of stock options reduced the tax liabilities for most firms within the
sample grew in magnitude over the period 1997-2000. Over the entire sample of firm
years total tax benefit from stock options was 2.14 times greater than the total US
current tax expense reported by all firms. For the 81.5% of firm years with positive
current income tax expense, the total tax benefit of stock options was 1.96 times greater
than the total US current tax expense reported by this subsample of firms. After taking
into account the tax benefit of stock option exercise for each firm year, adjusted current
income tax expense is positive for only 177 out of 366 firm year sample observations
containing data. Figure 2 depicts the annual growth in these option tax benefits on an
annual basis for the fiscal years 1997-2000.
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Figure 2. Annual Tax Benefits and Cash Proceeds from Stock Option Exercise 1997-2000
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Cash generated by employee stock options within the sample also grew in
magnitude over the sample period. Over the entire sample, the cash generated by the
strike price received by firms upon the exercise of employee stock options totaled 31%
of total net cash flows from financing activities over all annual reports over 385 sample
firm year observations containing this data. Annual percentages of cash generated by
firms from option exercise represented 34.4%, 26.5%, 29.9% and 33.8% of net cash
flows from financing activities for fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively.
At the sample median, annual percentages of cash generated by the cash received by
firms upon option exercise represented 19.1%, 36.0%, 26.0% and 54.3% of net cash
flows from financing activities for fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively.
Figure 2 also depicts the growth in total cash received annually by sample firms upon
the exercise of stock options for fiscal years 1997-2000. Clearly the exercise of nonqualified employee stock options represented growing amounts of tax benefits through
compensation deductions as well as a growing source of cash financing between 1997
and 2000 for this sample of firms comprising the NASDAQ-100 index at the close of FY
2000. For as many of 35 firms out of the total sample of 97 firms, cash generated from
employee stock option exercise exceeded global net income in at least one fiscal year.
For 14 firms, cash generated by employee stock options exceeded global net income in
all four sample years. It is easy to draw the conclusion that for many of these firms,
stock options functioned not only as a form of tax shield but also as an important source
of cash financing.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS

The fixed effects panel OLS estimates of the two regression equations resulted in
the following coefficient estimates with t-Statistics in parentheses:
USTUSAtj = 0.269280 + 0.062839*LNDCTESOtj + 0.032676*SIZEtj -0.157536*FGNRATIOtj,
(0.843238) (3.304858)
(1.169638)
(-0.976068)
2

sec = 0.494028, R = 0.231359; Equation (1)
USTUSStj = -0.008737 + 0.013107*LNDCTESOtj + 0.003506*SIZEtj + 0.091279FGNRATIOtj,
(-0.149294) (3.896417)
(0.703723)
(3.125932)
2

sec = 0.091227, R = 0.263636; Equation (2)

Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.207 for the return on sales equation (2) and 1.217 for the
return on asset equation (1) do not rise above 1.5, the approximate critical value at
which the null hypothesis of serial correlation among the residuals can be rejected
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Appendix D). Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation
Lagrange multiplier tests also shows highly significant evidence of serial correlation
among the OLS residuals. One undesirable consequence of serial correlation among
the OLS residuals is that parameter estimates are no longer minimum variance which
results in misleading tests of significance for hypothesis testing (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 409415). Therefore a method to remedy this serial correlation among sample observations
will be attempted. The simplest remedial method for serial correlation is to transform
the OLS model into a first-order autoregressive model through the addition of an
autoregressive term to both equations (1) and (2).
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A first-order autoregressive model takes previous residual values into the
estimation of the current model in an attempt to reduce the negative consequences of
serial correlation through an iterative process (Maddala, 1992, p. 252). An iterative
process is necessary due to the inability to observe the actual preceding residual
values. Using the autoregressive model to estimate adjusted equations (1) and (2)
reduces the influence of serial correlation and improves the estimation of the regression
equation parameters.
The coefficient estimates with t-Statistics in parentheses for the first-order
autoregressive models are as follows:
USTUSAtj = 0.212234 + 0.046068*LNDCTESOtj + 0.057457*SIZEtj -0.100385*FGNRATIOtj,
(0.504793) (2.020227)
(1.569782)
(-0.439172)
2

sec = 0.458110, R = 0.392532; Equation (1)
USTUSStj = -0.051525 + 0.006645*LNDCTESOtj + 0.01404*SIZEtj + 0.081198*FGNRATIOtj,
(-0.690444) (1.753097)
(2.250256)
(2.085992)
2

sec = 0.091227, R = 0.263636; Equation (2)

Under the autoregressive models, Durbin-Watson statistics are higher than the
approximate 1.5 critical threshold level at 2.0267 for equation (1) and 1.9441 for
equation (2) allowing for the rejection of the null hypothesis of serial correlation among
the residuals (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Appendix D). In the absence of serial
correlation, minimum variance parameter estimates allow for more accurate significance
testing for the rejection or acceptance of the research hypotheses. However, the
parameter estimates achieved through the autoregressive model are initially puzzling.
For both equations (1) and (2) the predictor variable of interest, LNDCTESOtj has for
both equations a smaller coefficient that has become practically inconsistent for both
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estimations. Despite the decline in significance for nearly all independent variables, the
addition of the autoregressive terms increased the amount of sample variation
explained by the two models as measured by an increased R2 for the autoregressive
model. My first reaction to these results is to suspect another violation of OLS
regression assumptions, that of no multicollinearity between the independent variables
(Gujarati, 1995, p 319). One indication of multicollinearity in the regression equation is
the presence of low t-statistics reported for regression coefficients even while the model
has good fit to our data with relatively high R2. Table 4 presents the coefficients of
correlation between the three metric explanatory variables contained in both regression
equations.
Table 4
Pairwise Correlations among Sample Predictor Variables
LNDCTESO

SIZE

FGNRATIO

LNDCTESO

1

0.523797

0.126697

SIZE
FGNRATIO

0.523797
0.126697

1
0.106274

0.106274
1

The highest level of correlation among variable pairs is between the tax predictor
variable LNDCTESOtj and the control variable SIZEtj. The pairwise correlation between
the two is about 0.52, much lower than 0.8 which would suggest high multicollinearity,
yet above the minimum value at which multicollinearity is likely to exist (Gujarati, 1995,
pp. 335-337). Dropping the control variable SIZEtj from the regression equation could
solve a problem with multicollinearity if it exists, but might also result in model
misspecification due to an omitted variable. Although dropping the control variable
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SIZEtj does in fact result in smaller standard errors and larger t-statistics when this more
parsimonious model is estimated for both equations (1) and (2), the elimination the
control variable for SIZEtj is not adequately justified given the relatively low pairwise
correlation between the independent variables as seen in Table 4, and in light of prior
research which has documented a size effect for some studies of income shifting.
Therefore eliminating the control variable SIZEtj would likely result in model
misspecification absent more evidence to the contrary. Adding to my confidence in this
decision not to drop a variable to remedy my possible problem with multicollinearity is a
discussion of lagged dependent variables by Achen, (2000). Not all the independent
variables in the autoregressive model are reported with high standard errors and
insignificant t-Statistic values as might indicate the presence of multicollinearity. In fact,
the most significant independent variable in my autoregressive model is the
autoregressive term AR(1) , which also has the highest coefficient value among
predictor variables. According to Achen, (2000) the addition of an autoregressive leg
term to regression model has often resulted in an appearance of dominance within the
model by the autoregressive term as it exhibits a relatively high and very significant
coefficient value compared to other independent variables contained in the regression
model. Such a reduction in both coefficient value and significance upon model
variables resulting from the introduction of an autoregressive term is due to the
occurrence of a strong trend within one or more explanatory variables (Achen, 2000).
One possible solution to this problem cited by Achen, (2000) is from a 1996
paper which suggests the use of Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) using
panel weights to correct for both heteroskedasticity and serially correlated residuals in
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panel data (Beck and Katz, 1996). The results of estimating the regression equations
(1) and (2) using the EGLS method are as follows:
USTUSAtj = 0.325457 + 0.041090*LNDCTESOtj + 0.27775*SIZEtj - 0.007588*FGNRATIOtj,
(0.858100) (2.342668)
(1.027165)
(0.042307)
2

sec = 1.012382, R = 0.144652; Equation (1)
USTUSStj = -0.010755 + 0.007368*LNDCTESOtj + 0.005135*SIZEtj + 0.03459*FGNRATIOtj,
(-0.147976) (2.356550)
(1.040668)
(2.487883)
2

sec = 0.992332, R = 0.149019; Equation (2)

Between the previous estimation of the autoregressive model in this estimation of the
EGLS model above, the coefficients on LNDCTESOtj changed very little, decreasing
only 0.005 for equation (1) and increasing only 0.001 for equation (2). However, the
coefficients on LNDCTESOtj have substantially increased in significance, approaching
the .01 level of significance within both equation (1) and equation (2). How then should
these results be interpreted?
For both equations (1) and (2) the coefficients on LNDCTESOtj both have a
positive sign indicating a direct relationship between the absolute dollar value of stock
option deductions available to sample firms, and their levels of taxable return on both
long-term domestic assets as well as to domestic sales. The coefficient on
LNDCTESOtj for equation (1), which had as its dependent variable the ratio of US
taxable income to identifiable long-term US assets, was 0.04. Interpretation of this
coefficient is that for every dollar of increased stock option deduction available to the
firm, the conditional mean of the dependent variable, the ratio of US taxable return on
US long term assets, could be expected to rise on average by 0.04. This coefficient is
significant, although not highly so, falling just short of the 0.01 level (p=0.0198). The
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coefficient on LNDCTESOtj for equation (2), which had as its dependent variable the
ratio of US taxable income to US sales, was 0.007. Interpretation of this coefficient is
that for every dollar of increased stock option deduction available to the firm, the
dependent variable USTUSAtj a ratio of US taxable return to US sales could be
expected to rise on average by 0.007, holding all other variable constant (Maddala,
1992, p. 150). This coefficient is also significant, but not highly significant, falling just
short of the 0.01 level (p=0.0190).
There is little doubt that these coefficients are statistically significant in the sense
that it can be said with confidence that both coefficients are non-zero. However, is the
magnitude of these coefficients large enough to suggest that they are of practical
importance such that H1 can be supported? Standardized coefficients for LNDCTESOtj
are calculated by multiplying the coefficient by the ratio of its variable standard deviation
over the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Standardized coefficients for
LNDCTESOtj are 0.22414 for Equation (1) and 0.162598 for Equation (2). Standardized
regression coefficients represent the change to the dependent variable measured in
standard deviations which would result from a one standard deviation increase to the
value of the predictor variable. There is not as much variability within the distribution of
the dependent variable USTUSSjt as compared to the dependent variable USTUSAjt as
shown in Figure 3. For this reason a one standard deviation change in LNDCTESOtj
results in similar amounts of change between the two dependent variables in terms
standard deviations of change. The coefficients are much closer than in the
unstandardized regression however the two standardized coefficients are not
comparable in the same way as two standardized coefficients within the same equation
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against the same dependent variable. Nevertheless, they do give a certain amount of
comparability in terms of the relative magnitude of influence exerted upon its respective
dependent variables in terms of the extent of change across the dependent variable
within my sample. On that, basis both LNDCTESOtj coefficients from each equation are
of relative importance in explaining the effect a change in stock option tax benefit has
on the amount of income a firm recognizes within the US relative to US long term assets
or US sales. However, in both equation (1) and equation (2) explain a small portion,
only 14.9% and 14.5%% of the variation in their dependent measures respectively.
The next step taken to gather evidence for the testing of hypothesis 2 involved
the bifurcating of the entire sample into two groups, one of purely domestic firms and
the other group of multinational firms. Additional inference might be drawn about cross
border income shifting engaged in by multinational firms by comparing the regression
results from that group to a second group of purely domestic firms which have no
foreign operations with which to shift into US. Due to the reduced sample size, it was
not possible to include all the SICtj industry variables without creating perfect
multicollinearity. The results for equations (1) and (2) estimated upon the multinational
sub-sample of 76 firms across 259 firm years are as follows:
USTUSAtj = -0.056233 + 0.053914*LNDCTESOtj + 0.018712*SIZEtj +0.072067*FGNRATIOtj,
(-0.19390) (2.836027)
(0.585462)
(0.310218)
2

sec = 1.000609, R = 0.068936; Equation (1)
USTUSStj = -0.027519 + 0.009735*LNDCTESOtj + 0.003022*SIZEtj + 0.092633*FGNRATIOtj,
(-0.553324) (2.921782)
(0.549317)
(2.331821)
2

sec = 0.992491, R = 0.130861; Equation (2)
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Equations (1) and (2) estimated upon the purely domestic sub-sample of 24 firms
across 60 firm years, excluding several industry variables as in the multinational sample
and excluding FGNRATIOtj which is zero for all domestic firms by definition, the results
are as follows:
USTUSAtj = 0.178016 – 0.032199*LNDCTESOtj + 0.074194*SIZEtj ,
(1.117492) (-2.027787)
(3.920905)
2

sec = 0.952727, R = 0.643066; Equation (1)
USTUSStj = 0.028135 – 0.011671*LNDCTESOtj + 0.011453*SIZEtj
(0.683889) (-2.871883)
(2.249052)
2

sec = 0.940083, R = 0.342119; Equation (2)

The results of the parameter estimates for these two equations upon the bifurcated
sample illustrate substantial differences between these two subsamples one of
multinational firms and another consisting of purely domestic firms.
Within the panel of multinational firms, coefficient estimates on the tax variable
LNDCTESOtj point to a larger positive effect upon the dependent variable in both
equations in comparison to those estimated from the full sample. Even so, for the
equation (1) the R2 coefficient of correlation at 0.07 is indicative of lower explanatory
power upon variation within the dependent variable USTUSAtj compared to the whole
sample, which may be due in part to the reduction in bifurcated sample size. The
overall equation exhibits low statistical significance as the null hypothesis that all the
coefficients are not significantly different from zero can be rejected at only a very low
level of significance based on the F-statistic calculated for Equation (1) as estimated
upon the subsample of multinational firms.
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Also for the multinational subset of firms, the combined explanatory power of the
predictor variables for equation (2) is very significant for the overall equation. The null
hypothesis of all the coefficients being not significantly different from zero is easily
rejected at a high level of significance with the F-statistic. The coefficient on
LNDCTESOtj is highly significant, along with high significance for the positive coefficient
on FNGRATIOtj. In fact, the coefficient on FNGRATIOtj, the ratio of foreign to global
sales for each firm year observation, is positive over the estimated equation (2) for the
full sample and both equations (1) and (2) for the multinational samples. This ratio has
no meaning for the sample of purely domestic firms. , this variable representing in part
the extent of global operations on the part of each multinational firm is consistently
positive as well for equation (2), which has as its dependent variable current US taxable
income scaled by US sales.
To various degrees, in every estimation of equation (2) increased foreign
operations are associated with increased US taxable return on sales. One explanation
for this finding might be that along with a greater extent of multinational operations
these firms also experience increased opportunities to shift their foreign income back
into the United States to take advantage of tax benefits which have become available as
the result of the employee exercise of stock options, which effectively lower the tax
rates that shifted or repatriated income will face upon its arrival here in the US.
It is much harder to move assets around the world that it is to move income
around the world through the various income shifting techniques. The coefficients on
FGNRATIOtj estimated on equation (1) against US taxable return on US long term
assets are insignificant for both the full sample and the purely multinational subset of
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firms. This is inconsistent with growing opportunities for cross border income shifting
based on the extent of foreign sales. Alternatively, it may also be a reflection of
measurement error in the variable foreign sales as firms designated as foreign sales
their US export sales.
Both equations (1) and (2) estimated for the domestic sample of firms, showed
substantially higher R2 values of 0.64 and 0.32 respectively. These are firms that due to
their lack of international operations are incapable of engaging in cross-border
multinational income shifting through any majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.
Increased profitability as measured by current tax expense scaled by either domestic
long-term assets or domestic sales seems to be a function of firm size and industry
affects among these domestic firms. The high explanatory power of these two
equations as compared to those estimated on multinational samples in terms of R2
suggest that the set of factors which contribute to variation in profitability between
multinational firms is larger and perhaps more complex than those needed to explain
variations in profitability between purely domestic firms in the US.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

It was first hypothesized that firms with the greatest tax benefits from stock
options would display the greatest level of domestic current taxable return on domestic
assets and/or domestic current taxable return on domestic sales. Current tax expense
is reported without any reduction for the tax benefits of stock option exercise, therefore
it reflects a measure of profitability for a purely domestic firm as well as a measure of
both profitability and current income recognized within the US by multinational
corporations. Evidence of a relationship between increasing tax benefits accruing to
firms from the employee exercise of stock options, and increased US profitability was
very significant from a statistical standpoint. As to explanatory power of stock option tax
benefits with respect to cross-border income shifting from the standpoint of practical
importance, since the dependent variables were each operationalized as quasi-financial
ratios: taxable return on US assets and taxable return on US sales, a slow percentage
growth in these ratios of US profitability, particularly if associated with greater tax
benefits from stock option deductions, would be meaningful evidence for support of H1.
Increasing measures of US taxable return ratios in the presence of increased tax
benefits from employee stock options operating to effectively reduce corporate tax rates
for these firms provides evidence consistent with either reduced income shifting out of
the US and/or the shifting of foreign income into the United States in support of the
acceptance of Hypothesis 1.
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While the significant positive coefficients on FGNRATIOtj over estimations of
equation (2) might suggest that a firm’s opportunities to shift income internationally
grown as the ratio of foreign sales to global sales increases with expanding foreign
operations, an alternative explanation might be that increasing US export sales drive the
increase in US tax expense even as these US export sales were classified as foreign
sales. If the amount of US export sales classified as foreign sales is sufficiently large, it
would certainly bias the results in favor of a finding that income is being shifting into the
US due to systemic measurement error within this variable. While the extent of any
such bias is unknown, if the results are biased in this fashion then this would call into
question any conclusions drawn based on equation (2) where the dependent variable is
taxable income as a proportion of US sales which would also show systemic
measurement errors due to the classification of US export sales if in fact the problem is
widespread among sample firm years.
Therefore, more reliable conclusions about possible income shifting can be
drawn from Equation (1) where current tax expense as a ratio of US long term assets
was the dependent variable. The reason for this expectation of greater internal validity
for parameters estimated for Equation (1) is two-fold. First, any material changes to the
amount of a firm’s long term US assets, even if in response to changing tax incentives
would not generally be instantaneous. Even if US long term asset values fluctuate in
response to changing tax incentives, such asset value changes would occur with a
considerable response lag time. For this reason, the effect of income shifting into the
US upon the dependent variable in Equation (1) would be reflected in the current tax
expense numerator while the denominator, comprised of long term US assets, would
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remain relatively more stable even in the presence of cross border income shifting by a
firm.
Conversely, evidence of income shifting behavior, particularly tax motivated
transfer price manipulations by a firm, would be likely to affect both the numerator and
denominator of the dependent variable in Equation (2). Income shifting into the United
States would inflate the numerator for increased current taxes due on the shifted
income, while the denominator would likely also change from an increase to US sales
revenue due to tax motivated transfer price manipulation designed to increase US
income. At best, USTUSStj is a noisy proxy variable with which to measure the latency
of income shifting. Even if the evidence obtained from Equation (1) is more reliable for
drawing inferences about these firms, the results from Equation (2) show a very high
level of significance across the full and multinational samples for the coefficients on
LNDCTESOtj in further support of H1.
An alternative explanation to Hypothesis 1 for these results could be that
multinational firms are just more profitable than their domestic counterparts and it is this
fact alone that drives any observed increase in the ratio US current taxes to assets? If
multinational firms were merely more profitable, wouldn’t the market reward these
winning firms with higher and higher stock prices which would as a consequence,
increase the amount of compensation deductions resulting from employees exercising
their options with larger gains in excess of strike prices? There are two reasons to
discount this particular alternative explanation for the findings. First, previous research
points to multinational firms increasing global operations and profit margins outside the
US without increasing overall global profitability (Grubert, 2012). Second, if the
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observed level of US profitability measured by US taxable return on US Long term
assets was due only to inherently greater profitability on the part of multinational firms,
then the coefficient on FGNRATIOtj should have been positive and significant as
multinational operations even if only related to US exports, would have been associated
with increased profitability as measured by the dependent USTUSAtj. The coefficient on
FGNRATIOtj was insignificant upon each estimation of Equation (1) so that greater
profitability on the part of multinational firms can be rejected in favor of increased return
on long term domestic assets due to income shifting into the US by multinational firms
facing tax motivated income shifting incentives. The income shifting incentives for these
firms are the opposite of a more typical firm due to the effectively lower rates these
option intensive firms face due to the extent of stock options exercised by their
employees. Since this behavior is exogenously determined from the standpoint of these
firms it is similar in nature to tax rate reductions which would also be exogenously
determined by government.
Sufficient evidence exists within this study to reject the null hypothesis of no
income shifting and instead to conclude that option intensive firms in the 1990’s
engaged in cross border income shifting, leading to the acceptance of H1. Hypothesis
2, which was essentially that option intensive multinational firms would show higher US
profitability than shown by their option intensive purely domestic counterparts, cannot
be supported by the evidence provided by these equations estimated on either the full
sample or the bifurcated samples. Evidence of greater profitability on the part of
multinational firms compared to their purely domestic counterparts was provided by the
estimates of Equation (2) as the coefficient on FGNRATIOtj was both positive and
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significant for both the full sample and the multinational sample. However due to the
potential measurement errors inherent in FGNRATIOtj due to US export sale
classification; I am reluctant to conclude that the evidence provided is sufficient to
support H2.
The results of bifurcating the sample into multinational and domestic subsamples
generate additional implications for future research. The much larger coefficients of
determination resulting from the estimation of the purely domestic sample as compared
to either the multinational sample or the full sample causes me to question the nature of
the additional complexity within the US profitability of firms with multinational operations.
Could the introduction of additional control variables increase the predictive ability of the
regression equations and lead to a better understanding of the effects of stock option
intensity on cross border income shifting? While the current study included those
variables which previous research had documented as important to corporate income
shifting behavior, other factors probably contribute to corporate profitability even if they
have not been shown to contribute to the understanding of firm income shifting
behavior.
Additionally, although I believe that in substance the effect of stock option
deductions is essentially equivalent to a reduction in statutory rates individually faced by
each firm, the actual form of these stock options remains a tax shield and a deduction
against corporate income to the firm. If indeed the stock option tax benefit variable is a
good proxy for a hypothetical corporate tax rate deduction on an individual firm basis, its
estimation may have included significant noise within that estimation. Regression
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equations (1) and (2) in total explain less than 15% of the variation in their respective
dependent variables.
If stock option deductions are indeed essentially equivalent to a statutory rate
deduction, perhaps they are in the nature of temporary tax rate reductions rather than
actual long term permanent rate reductions. The importance of this distinction is with
respect to any contribution by this research to the larger question of whether US
corporate income taxes are too high relative to our non-US national competitors in the
global economy. Beyond the scope of this discussion is the possibility that tax benefits
from stock option exercise are in the nature of transitory benefits. Such transitory
benefits were initially described by Milton Friedman. According to his permanent
income hypothesis, transitory tax benefits would be less likely to change firm behavior
(Friedman, 1992).
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Appendix A
Firms Comprising the NASDAQ 100 Index on May 30, 2001
Apple Inc.

AAPL

Abgenix Inc

ABGX

Adobe Systems Incorporated

ADBE

ADC Telecommunications

ADCT

Adelphia Communications Corporation

ADELQ

Altera Corporation

ALTR

Applied Materials Inc.

AMAT

Applied Micro Circuits Corporation

AMCC

Amgen Inc.

AMGN

Amazon.com Inc.

AMZN

Ariba Inc

ARBA

At Home Corporation

ATHMQ

Atmel Corporation

ATML

Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.

BBBY

BEA Systems Inc.

BEAS

Biogen Inc

BIIB

Biotet Inc.

BMET

Brocade Communications Systems Inc

BRCD

Broadcom Corporation

BRCM

BroadVision Inc

BVSN

Concord EFS

CEFT

Chiron Corporation

CHIR

Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.

CHKP

CIENA Corporation

CIEN

Comcast Corporation - Special Class A

CMCSK

CMGI Inc (MLNK:2008)

CMGI

Comverse Technology Inc

CMVT

CNET Networks

CNET

Conexant Systems Inc (Formerly Rockwell Semiconductor Systems)

CNXT

3Com Corporation

COMS

Costco Wholesale Corporation

COST

Compuware Corporation

CPWR

Cisco Systems Inc.

CSCO

Cintas Corporation

CTAS

Citrix Systems Inc.

CTXS

Dell Inc.

DELL

Dish Network Corporation

DISH

Electronic Arts Inc.

EA

eBay Inc.

EBAY
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LM Ericsson Telephone Company

ERICY

Exodus Communications Inc

EXDSQ

Fiserv Inc.

FISV

Flextronics International Ltd.

FLEX

Genzyme

GENZ

Gemstar-TV Guide International Inc

GMSTE

Human Genome Sciences Inc

HGSI

IAC/InterActiveCorp

IACI

IDEC Pharmaceuticals Corporation

IDPH

Immunex Corporation

IMNX

Inktomi Corporation

INKT

Intel Corporation

INTC

Intuit Inc.

INTU

i2 Technologies Inc

ITWO

Sun Microsystems

JAVA

JDS Uniphase Corporation

JDSU

Juniper Networks

JNPR

KLA Tencor Corporation

KLAC

Linear Technology Corporation

LLTC

Level 3 Communications Inc

LVLT

Microchip Technology Incorporated

MCHP

McLeodUSA Inccorporated

MCLD

Medimmune Inc.

MEDI

Mercury Interactive Corporation

MERQE

Metromedia Fiber Network Inc

MFNX

Millennium Pharmaceuticals Inc

MLNM

Molex Inc

MOLX

Microsoft Corporation

MSFT

Maxim Integrated Products Inc

MXIM

Novell Inc

NOVL

NetApp Inc.

NTAP

NVIDA Corporation

NVDA

Novellus Systems Inc

NVLS

Nextel Communications Inc

NXTL

Oracle Corporation

ORCL

Palm Inc

PALM

Paychex Inc.

PAYX

PACCAR Inc.

PCAR

PMC Sierra Inc

PMCS

Parametric Technology Corporation

PMTC

PeopleSoft Inc.

PSFT

QUALCOMM Incorporated

QCOM

QLogic Corp

QLGC
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Rational Sortware Corporation

RATL

RF Micro Devices Inc

RFMD

RealNetworks Inc

RNWK

Sanmina-SCI Corp

SANM

Starbucks Corporation

SBUX

Siebel Systems Inc.

SEBL

Staples Inc.

SPLS

PanAmSat Corporation

SPOT

Smurfit-Stone Container Corp

SSCC

Tellabs Inc

TLAB

TMP Worldwide Inc. (Became Monster Worldwide, Inc 2003 MNST)

TMPW

VeriSign Inc.

VRSN

VERITAS Software Corporation

VRTS

Vitesse Semiconductior Corporation

VTSS

WorldCom Inc

WCOEQ

Xilinx Inc.

XLNX

XO Communications Inc

XOXO

Yahoo! Inc.

YHOO
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Appendix B
Output from E-Views Statistical Analysis Software Package
OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regression Model Time Series Dummy Variables: Equation (1)
Dependent Variable: USTUSA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/15/12 Time: 13:07
Sample: 1 396
Included observations: 319
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

0.269280
0.062839
0.032676
-0.157539
-0.605765
0.594509
0.668122
0.283042
0.425415
0.259435
0.244484
0.852834
0.844425
0.317578
0.716262
0.846324
0.202207
0.503141
0.149938
0.121157
0.061560

0.319341
0.019014
0.027937
0.161402
0.359549
0.364113
0.269546
0.266944
0.263191
0.437615
0.310998
0.266420
0.351200
0.350331
0.350830
0.304365
0.350279
0.258592
0.087934
0.084417
0.078664

0.843238
3.304858
1.169638
-0.976068
-1.684790
1.632759
2.478692
1.060305
1.616374
0.592840
0.786128
3.201082
2.404398
0.906510
2.041621
2.780625
0.577274
1.945698
1.705108
1.435225
0.782572

0.3998
0.0011
0.2431
0.3298
0.0931
0.1036
0.0137
0.2899
0.1071
0.5537
0.4324
0.0015
0.0168
0.3654
0.0421
0.0058
0.5642
0.0526
0.0892
0.1523
0.4345

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.231359
0.179772
0.494028
72.73106
-216.8330
4.484863
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

0.311001
0.545487
1.491116
1.738981
1.590104
1.217456
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OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regression Model Time Series Dummy Variables: Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: USTUSS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/15/12 Time: 13:11
Sample: 1 396
Included observations: 341
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

-0.008737
0.013107
0.003506
0.091279
-0.006351
0.032101
0.022989
0.027549
-0.012112
0.054330
-0.036392
0.081633
0.100516
0.021134
0.049605
0.088630
-0.017638
0.040450
0.021430
0.011595
0.001997

0.058523
0.003364
0.004982
0.029201
0.066320
0.067002
0.049172
0.049227
0.048504
0.080692
0.057361
0.048799
0.064846
0.064682
0.064766
0.056173
0.064673
0.047549
0.015800
0.015089
0.014069

-0.149294
3.896417
0.703723
3.125932
-0.095758
0.479112
0.467523
0.559629
-0.249700
0.673302
-0.634433
1.672838
1.550064
0.326738
0.765917
1.577785
-0.272730
0.850699
1.356360
0.768474
0.141935

0.8814
0.0001
0.4821
0.0019
0.9238
0.6322
0.6404
0.5761
0.8030
0.5012
0.5263
0.0953
0.1221
0.7441
0.4443
0.1156
0.7852
0.3956
0.1759
0.4428
0.8872

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.263636
0.217613
0.091227
2.663140
343.4722
5.728380
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

0.076162
0.103136
-1.891332
-1.655351
-1.797314
1.207335
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Results of LM Tests for Serial Correlation OLS Residuals: Equations (1) and (2)
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier Test
Equation (1) OLS
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

32.66715
57.67967

Prob. F(2,296)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.0000
0.0000

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier Test

Equation (2) OLS
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared

30.87061
55.44237

Prob. F(2,318)
Prob. Chi-Square(2)

0.0000
0.0000
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First-Order Autoregressive OLS Panel Regression Fixed Effects Model: Equation (1)
Dependent Variable: USTUSA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/12 Time: 16:04
Sample (adjusted): 2 396
Included observations: 287 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999
AR(1)

0.044230
0.068140
-0.106405
0.174046
0.569249
0.592628
0.102704
0.330098
0.771752
0.136196
0.912789
0.854959
0.212578
0.591383
0.895948
0.013400
0.449362
0.179854
0.137737
0.081592
0.506141

0.022490
0.029786
0.227953
0.423747
0.434747
0.230844
0.246442
0.220619
0.967002
0.324403
0.277349
0.394780
0.378764
0.375135
0.302662
0.393185
0.202287
0.079913
0.076046
0.059074
0.054738

1.966638
2.287653
-0.466787
0.410731
1.309379
2.567220
0.416746
1.496232
0.798088
0.419837
3.291116
2.165661
0.561241
1.576452
2.960228
0.034080
2.221405
2.250629
1.811234
1.381199
9.246691

0.0503
0.0229
0.6410
0.6816
0.1915
0.0108
0.6772
0.1358
0.4255
0.6749
0.0011
0.0312
0.5751
0.1161
0.0034
0.9728
0.0272
0.0252
0.0712
0.1684
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.391947
0.346229
0.457468
55.66765
-171.8834
2.026714

Inverted AR Roots

.51

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.

0.325013
0.565780
1.344135
1.611902
1.451452
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First-Order Autoregressive OLS Panel Regression Fixed Effects Model: Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: USTUSS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/28/12 Time: 16:01
Sample (adjusted): 2 396
Included observations: 313 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999
AR(1)

0.007006
0.011568
0.082471
0.126269
0.095159
0.057684
0.055648
0.023229
0.157343
0.010400
0.153787
0.114340
0.052756
0.082236
0.152652
-0.009602
0.073924
0.016274
0.004195
0.003470
0.471725

0.003753
0.005121
0.038827
0.075321
0.076521
0.039034
0.043293
0.038650
0.165067
0.057418
0.048176
0.070435
0.067521
0.067104
0.054119
0.069589
0.035813
0.013839
0.013365
0.010603
0.053532

1.866794
2.258792
2.124062
1.676413
1.243571
1.477779
1.285371
0.601012
0.953205
0.181131
3.192210
1.623353
0.781334
1.225499
2.820689
-0.137982
2.064163
1.175980
0.313846
0.327240
8.812039

0.0629
0.0246
0.0345
0.0947
0.2147
0.1405
0.1997
0.5483
0.3413
0.8564
0.0016
0.1056
0.4352
0.2214
0.0051
0.8903
0.0399
0.2406
0.7539
0.7437
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.414795
0.374712
0.083678
2.044576
343.2257
1.944122

Inverted AR Roots

.47

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.

0.077683
0.105821
-2.058950
-1.807607
-1.958507
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Equation (1)
Dependent Variable: USTUSA
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/03/12 Time: 12:42
Sample: 1997 2000
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 89
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 319
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

0.325457
0.041090
0.027775
-0.007588
-0.718941
0.527535
0.583535
0.251775
0.416460
0.326254
0.206770
0.732187
0.754737
0.220656
0.654551
0.718614
-0.009366
0.467732
0.104707
0.080445
0.056626

0.379276
0.017540
0.027041
0.179349
0.459801
0.470238
0.344390
0.341562
0.335663
0.569594
0.398959
0.342280
0.453622
0.452668
0.452910
0.392336
0.452676
0.331020
0.090856
0.061600
0.043032

0.858100
2.342668
1.027165
-0.042307
-1.563594
1.121849
1.694404
0.737130
1.240706
0.572782
0.518274
2.139145
1.663800
0.487456
1.445212
1.831631
-0.020690
1.413000
1.152453
1.305918
1.315921

0.3915
0.0198
0.3052
0.9663
0.1190
0.2628
0.0912
0.4616
0.2157
0.5672
0.6047
0.0332
0.0972
0.6263
0.1494
0.0680
0.9835
0.1587
0.2501
0.1926
0.1892

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.144652
0.087246
1.012382
2.519808
0.000434

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.444451
1.065026
305.4251
1.967813

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.221161
73.69601

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.311001
0.795042
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: USTUSS
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/03/12 Time: 12:46
Sample: 1997 2000
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 94
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 341
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC23
SIC26
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC37
SIC38
SIC48
SIC53
SIC57
SIC58
SIC59
SIC60
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

-0.010755
0.007368
0.005135
0.083459
-0.045651
0.033882
0.002743
0.009557
-0.024371
0.055896
-0.057552
0.042629
0.078020
0.006285
0.032394
0.062232
-0.039534
0.020307
0.011790
0.002087
0.000709

0.072680
0.003127
0.004935
0.033546
0.089026
0.090055
0.065967
0.066038
0.064987
0.108526
0.077200
0.065601
0.087915
0.087741
0.087847
0.076069
0.087749
0.063961
0.014476
0.011721
0.010444

-0.147976
2.356550
1.040668
2.487883
-0.512782
0.376236
0.041578
0.144713
-0.375023
0.515045
-0.745489
0.649817
0.887441
0.071637
0.368760
0.818107
-0.450537
0.317486
0.814466
0.178064
0.067848

0.8825
0.0190
0.2988
0.0134
0.6085
0.7070
0.9669
0.8850
0.7079
0.6069
0.4565
0.5163
0.3755
0.9429
0.7126
0.4139
0.6526
0.7511
0.4160
0.8588
0.9459

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.149019
0.095833
0.992332
2.801839
0.000080

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.575441
1.044148
315.1111
1.811549

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.247697
2.720785

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.076162
0.840365
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Multinational Sample Equation (1)
Dependent Variable: USTUSA
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/09/12 Time: 09:09
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES>0
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 76
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 259
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC48
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

-0.056233
0.053914
0.018712
0.072067
0.195245
-0.085203
0.067795
0.326756
0.134535
0.133162
0.110245
0.059904

0.290009
0.019010
0.031961
0.232312
0.223029
0.177927
0.166062
0.220656
0.157937
0.109349
0.072244
0.048945

-0.193900
2.836027
0.585462
0.310218
0.875424
-0.478862
0.408251
1.480843
0.851829
1.217765
1.526006
1.223918

0.8464
0.0049
0.5588
0.7567
0.3822
0.6325
0.6834
0.1399
0.3951
0.2245
0.1283
0.2221

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.068936
0.027472
1.000609
1.662533
0.082498

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.412967
1.020377
247.3007
1.895068

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.117993
77.54782

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.336754
0.723978
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Domestic Sample Equation (1)
Dependent Variable: USTUSA
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/09/12 Time: 09:14
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES=0
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 24
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 60
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC48
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

0.178016
-0.032199
0.074194
0.474753
0.371756
0.299352
0.607671
0.365347
-0.097058
-0.060475
-0.018006

0.159300
0.015879
0.018923
0.082786
0.115946
0.083555
0.082349
0.071751
0.079734
0.072604
0.040733

1.117492
-2.027787
3.920905
5.734673
3.206296
3.582705
7.379247
5.091897
-1.217268
-0.832946
-0.442044

0.2692
0.0480
0.0003
0.0000
0.0024
0.0008
0.0000
0.0000
0.2293
0.4089
0.6604

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.643066
0.570222
0.952727
8.828033
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.909382
1.396966
44.47674
1.182437

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.549329
2.608336

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.199831
0.736637
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Multinational Sample Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: USTUSS
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/09/12 Time: 09:12
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES>0
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 81
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 280
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
FGNRATIO
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC48
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

-0.027519
0.009735
0.003022
0.092633
-0.024421
-0.004093
-0.046312
0.026503
0.005717
0.013039
0.004531
-0.000954

0.049734
0.003332
0.005502
0.039726
0.035809
0.031899
0.028621
0.033695
0.027118
0.016485
0.013209
0.011953

-0.553324
2.921782
0.549317
2.331821
-0.681969
-0.128296
-1.618093
0.786574
0.210823
0.790981
0.343026
-0.079801

0.5805
0.0038
0.5832
0.0205
0.4958
0.8980
0.1068
0.4322
0.8332
0.4297
0.7318
0.9365

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.130861
0.095187
0.992491
3.668274
0.000072

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.603176
1.046775
263.9904
1.768573

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.220115
2.565298

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.085091
0.822175
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Domestic Sample Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: USTUSS
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)
Date: 12/09/12 Time: 09:13
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES=0
Periods included: 4
Cross-sections included: 25
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 61
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LNDCTESO
SIZE
SIC28
SIC35
SIC36
SIC48
SIC73
DUM1997
DUM1998
DUM1999

0.028135
-0.011671
0.011453
0.055781
0.052983
0.005079
0.031445
0.028882
-0.026150
-0.015887
-0.004738

0.041139
0.004064
0.005092
0.019144
0.029900
0.020970
0.019571
0.017208
0.019040
0.017043
0.009506

0.683889
-2.871883
2.249052
2.913727
1.772036
0.242229
1.606732
1.678387
-1.373442
-0.932188
-0.498380

0.4972
0.0060
0.0289
0.0053
0.0825
0.8096
0.1144
0.0995
0.1757
0.3557
0.6204

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.342119
0.210543
0.940083
2.600156
0.012655

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

0.716760
1.057974
44.18778
1.269861

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.196071
0.162789

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

0.035177
0.933210
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